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Retroactive Taxation: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Minimum Tax On IDCst
JAMEs SEARS BRYANT*
As a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,' Congress enacted the
"minimum tax" on Intangible Drilling Costs (IDCs). This tax imposed
a 15% levy on the excess of IDCs deducted in one year over the amount
of the deduction that would have been allowed if such deduction had
been capitalized and amortized. IDCs are generally defined as costs
paid for items with no salvage value, such as costs paid to drilling
contractors, location and preparation costs paid to the dirt contractor,
drilling muds, etc. The tax was effective October 20, 1976, but has
been retroactively applied to noncorporate entities that have paid these
costs after January 1, 1976.2
Litigants and scholars have challenged the constitutionality of the
tax on grounds ranging from equal protection to due process. This
article, however, will demonstrate that the Act's invalidity, at least in
reference to the noncorporate oil and gas producer who derives the
bulk of his income from drilling, derives from the constitutional pro-
hibition against retroactive legislation under the due process clause.
More generally, the article will identify and clarify the chief source
of the confusion surrounding the validity of all retroactive tax statutes,
i.e., the courts' chronic use of categorical labels in ruling on retro-
active tax statutes' validity when they in fact base their judgments on
the foreseeability of the tax in question to the class of taxpayers affected.
The constitutionality of retroactive legislation per se has long been
established. In the early 1930s numerous cases upheld tax legislation
applied retroactively.' But the cases usually appear to hinge the con-
stitutionality of such retroactivity on the kind of tax under considera-
tion, allowing retroactivity across the board in the case of income taxes,
t This article explores what I believe to be an interesting constitutional issue regarding
the Federal Tax Code. Since I am a state judge and have no opportunity to pass upon this
issue or an analogous one, I feel this is a permissible exercise of scholarly analysis. It is in no
way meant to be a political statement or a judicial comment, but merely a scholarly article deal-
ing with a federal constitutional issue which is of a particular and personal interest.
* B.S. 1975, Phillips Univ.; J.D. 1978, Southern Methodist; M.A. 1980, Brandeis. Associate
District Judge, Fourth Judicial District of Oklahoma, Garfield County. The author wishes to
thank Stephen Jones, attorney, for his contribution to this article.-Ed.
1. 26 U.S.C. §§ 56, 57(11) (1976).
2. Id. § 57(D).
3. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172 (1933); Milliken
v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
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but forbidding them for other taxes, such as those on gifts or estates.
A closer reading of the cases, however, reveals that underlying the
courts' distinctions based on the kind of tax are analyses focusing on
the foreseeability of the tax in question by the tax-paying class affected.
Thus, while retroactive income taxes are usually upheld, it is because
they are generally ruled foreseeable. Retroactive gift and estate taxes
fail constitutionally because they are not. Therefore, when a specific
tax provision like the minimum tax on IDCs is at issue, the proper
analysis should key on its foreseeability, not its label as an income
tax. When properly analyzed, the minimum tax on IDCs and its effect
on the noncorporate oil and gas producer is clearly unconstitutional.
The Foreseeability Test Versus the Label Technique
The foreseeability rule has not always been submerged beneath an
analysis ostensibly focusing on the kind of tax under review; it was
explicitly relied upon in the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Welch v. Henry,' where the Court held that the key to a retroactive
tax's constitutionality was whether "the nature or amount of the tax
could not reasonably have been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time
of the particular voluntary act which the statute later made the taxable
event."5 The Court in Welch discussed the history of retroactive tax
statutes, noting when and in what circumstances they had been upheld
or overruled,6 and further pointed out that in some instances a retro-
active tax was declared unconstitutional when a gift or estate tax ap-
plied to transactions completed and vested before the enactment of
the taxing statute.
By way of contrast, the Court observed that the tax laws upheld
as valid usually were retroactive income taxes. The Court reasoned fur-
ther that this was true only because income taxes generally were
foreseeable while gift and estate taxes generally were not:
Since, in each of these [gift tax] cases, the donor might freely
have chosen to give, or not to give, the taxation, after the choice
was made, of a gift which he might well have refrained from making
had he anticipated the tax, was thought to be so arbitrary and
oppressive as to be a denial of due process .... Similarly, a tax
on the receipt of income is not comparable to a gift tax. We cannot
assume that stockholders would refuse to receive corporate
dividends even if they knew that their receipts would later be sub-
jected to a new tax or to the increase of an old one. .... 7
4. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
5. Id. at 147.
6. Id.




Yet the Court in Welch made clear that the simple categorization
of a tax as an income, gift, or estate tax did not determine its validity
as a retroactive tax.8 On the contrary, the Court expressly recognized
that "other forms" of retroactive taxation could be upheld, even as
applied to gift or estate taxes:
[T]here are other forms of taxation whose retroactive imposition
cannot be said to be similarly offensive, because their incidence
is not on the voluntary act of the taxpayer. And even a retroactive
gift tax has been held valid where the donor was forewarned by
the statute books of the possibility of such a levy. [Citations
omitted.]
In each case it is necessary to consider the nature of the tax and
the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said that its
retroactive application is so harsh and so oppressive as to trans-
gress the constitutional limitation.9
In short, Welch stressed foreseeability as the key to determining the
validity of a retroactive tax statute. Though historically the Court has
more often upheld retroactive income taxes than retroactive estate or
gift taxes, the true test of the validity of a retroactive tax has always
been the foreseeability of the tax and the reasonableness of taxpayer
reliance on legislative inaction in the field of a given transaction.
The courts have adhered to this rule since Untermyer v. Anderson.'0
In striking down a retroactive gift tax in Untermyer as unconstitutional
even though the gift was made while the bill was pending in Congress,
the Supreme Court emphasized the factor of foreseeability:
The mere fact that a gift was made while the bill containing the
questioned provisions was in the last stage of progress through Con-
gress we think is not enough ... to relieve the legislation of the
arbitrary character there ascribed to it. To accept the contrary view
would produce insuperable difficulties touching interpretation and
practical application of the statute, and render impossible proper
understanding of the burden intended to be imposed. The taxpayer
may justly demand to know when and how he becomes liable for
taxes-he cannot foresee and ought not to be required to guess
the outcome of pending measures. The future of every bill while
before Congress is necessarily uncertain. The will of the lawmakers
is not definitely expressed until final action thereon has been taken."
Similarly, the Supreme Court held another gift tax unconstitutional
8. Id. at 147.
9. Id.
10. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
11. Id. at 445-46.
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in Blodgett v. Holden.'2 Relying on Nichols v. Coolidge,'3 the Court
held: "It seems wholly unreasonable that one who, in entire good faith
and without the slightest premonition of such consequence, made abso-
lute disposition of his property by gifts should thereafter be required
to pay a charge for so doing."'"
Where retroactive taxes have been upheld, the decision sustaining
their validity has been grounded in the foreseeability of such taxes and
the resulting lack of taxpayer's reliance on their absence. In Milliken
v. United States,"s the Supreme Court upheld an estate tax providing
for the inclusion of the value of property transferred in contemplation
of death (prior to the statute's enactment) in the gross estate because
of the enactment's similarity to existing tax statutes. The statute was
constitutional because analogous earlier statutes imposed a tax on gifts
made in contemplation of death and these statutes were in effect at
the time of the gift "computed at the same value and rate as though
the property given had been a part of the donor's estate passing at
death." 6
Had the Court in Milliken based its decision on simple categorization
(income taxes qua income taxes), the tax would have been unconstitu-
tional based on the Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermyer decisions. In-
stead, the Court followed its reasoning of Welch and stressed that
foreseeability was the key issue as to a tax statute's validity. It held
that the tax in question was foreseeable because of its similarity to
previous and existing tax statutes. Because of such similarity, the tax-
payer's actions were not adversely affected by a reasonable reliance
upon the present tax structure.
When viewed in light of these cases, it becomes clear why retro-
active income taxes have so often been upheld.II Income taxes are con-
tinuing obligations and have similar and foreseeable rates; therefore,
the anticipated alteration of the details of the income tax structure does
not generally change the taxpayer's behavior or reliance. In Reinecke
v. Smith,'" the statute merely included the income of a revocable trust
in the income of the settlor for purposes of taxation. Similarly, in Burnet
v. Wells,'9 the statute taxed to the creator of the trust so much of
the income thereof as was devoted to maintaining an insurance policy
12. 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
13. 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
14. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927).
15. 283 U.S. 15 (1930).
16. Id. at 22.
17. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172 (1933).
18. 289 U.S. 172 (1933).




on his life. In neither of those cases would either the conduct of earn-
ing income or creating the trust have been significantly changed by
the enactment of the statute. The tax merely classified as income funds
generated by a trust. The primary goal of the taxpayer, creating the
trust, would have occurred regardless of how the trust income was
classified for tax purposes.
In those cases [cases omitted] the issue was the validity of a tax
on a transaction consummated before the enactment of the statute
authorizing the exaction. In the present case the subject of the tax
is not the creation of the trusts or the transfer of the corpus...
but the income of the trusts .... 10
Moreover, the type of taxes enacted were not new or novel, and
therefore could have been contemplated by the settlor of the trust had
the tax treatment of the trust been the primary consideration.
One of the clearest and more recent affirmations of the Welch test
was by the Tenth Circuit in Shanahan v. United States.' In holding
a retroactive tax statute constitutional, the court held that foreseeability
was the key issue and thus explained why retroactive gift and estate
taxes usually constitutionally fail where income taxes prevail:
[T]he justification for upholding retroactive income taxation does
not apply to estate and gift taxes because it cannot be assumed
that the taxpayer would dispose of his property in the same manner
if he had known about the consequences in relation to the tax.22
The test set forth in Welch v. Henry, supra, is to consider the nature
of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid. Retroactive
operation is constitutional where it is not harsh, arbitrary or un-
fair. . . 23
The court here clearly adumbrates a theory of foreseeability that is
not wholly defined in the ordinary sense of anticipation or expecta-
tion, but which instead looks at the question from the perspective of
hindsight and stresses the quality of the change's impact-"harsh,
arbitary or unfair"-over the degree of likelihood or unlikelihood of
its enactment. The court then postulates the question, "Given this enact-
ment's impact, would the taxpayer have altered his or her course of
behavior?"
The court in Shanahan believed that gift and estate taxes were usually
struck down because taxpayers would have behaved differently had
20. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 175 (1933).
21. 447 F.2d 1082 (10th Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 1083.
23. Id. at 1084.
19831
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they foreseen the tax. On the other hand, the court reasoned that tradi-
tional income taxes, being foreseeable and continuing obligations,
usually did not affect taxpayers by influencing their decision to pro-
duce income.2" In justifying its decision by explicitly affirming the Welch
decision,25 this circuit adopted a test that does not determine the validity
of a retroactive tax by classifying it rigidly as an income tax or gift
estate tax. Instead, Shanahan stressed the nature and foreseeability of
the tax and its fairness under the particular circumtances.
Many circuit courts have also applied the Shanahan foreseeability
test, administered hypothetically from the perspective of hindsight, and
found it to be a workable constitutional test. In Adams Nursing Home
of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews,26 the First Circuit noted the following
test of foreseeability: "In any retroactivity challenge, a central ques-
tion is how the challenger's conduct, or the conduct of others in his
class, would have differed if the law in issue had applied from the
start."27 In Purvis v. United States,28 the Ninth Circuit determined the
validity of a retroactive tax statute by analyzing the nature of the tax
and the circumstances in which it was laid. The court then outlined
its view of foreseeability as the key to upholding the tax in question:
"[W]ith the widespread notice given to the investing public it cannot
be said that retroactive application of this tax was oppressive or harsh
or confiscatory."' 2
9
Using a somewhat similar analysis, the Court of Claims in First Na-
tional Bank of Dallas v. United States30 held that the retroactive ap-
plication of a statute imposing interest equalization taxes on foreign
stock acquisitions by United States citizens was not arbitrary and
capricious and did not constitute deprivation of property without due
process of law. In so holding, the court premised its view on the fact
that in this particular tax statute there was extensive nonstatutory notice
prior to the enactment of the retroactive tax. But unlike Shanahan,
the focus was not on the oppressive quality of the tax from a perspec-
tive of hindsight, but rather was on the more traditional notice of
foreseeability, i.e., foreseeability judged from the perspective of the
taxpayer at the time of his actions. The issue was not oppression or
harshness, but publication: Had the taxpayers been adequately
forewarned?
24. Id. at 1082.
25. Id. at 1084.
26. 548 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1977).
27. Id. at 1081.
28. 501 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975).
29. Id. at 314.




In discussing what it believed to be the crucial issue of notice (or
foreseeability), the court noted that President Kennedy had delivered
to both Houses of Congress a message in July of 1963 where he pro-
posed an "interest equalization tax,"'" the purpose of which was to
alleviate the United States' balance of payment problem by restricting
long-term capital outflow from the United States. The proposed tax
was to be levied on purchases of foreign securities by United States
,citizens from foreign persons at an effective rate of 15% of the value
of the equity securities. After the presidential message was made public,
prices of stocks and bonds dropped on foreign exchanges and markets
reflected a strengthening position of the dollar and a rise in the prices
of United States bonds and Treasury bills. After July 1963, it became
generally known among dealers and brokers in stocks and bonds, both
in the United States and abroad, that the Kennedy administration had
recommended that the tax be effective on July 19, 1963. The President
specifically stated that the tax, once enacted, would be retroactive to
the date of this address.
The Treasury Department issued a 25-page detailed explanation of
the interest equalization tax and a 6-page brochure on information about
that tax. The Federal Register of August 1963 carried a notice of the
proposed effective date of the bill and meetings between representatives
of the Treasury Department and those of the stock exchanges were
held to procedurally implement the tax.
In upholding this tax, the court made it clear that the true test of
validity of the retroactive tax statute was its foreseeability and not its
characterization2:
It is well settled that an income tax statute may be given retro-
active effect without violating the Constitution. [Cases omitted.]
.. An examination of this principle reveals certain motivating con-
siderations .... An income tax is levied, moreover upon the pro-
ceeds of an "involuntary act," that is, it is generally assumed that
a taxpayer will generate income, rather than refrain from so doing,
irrespective of the imposition of a tax upon that income. And,
perhaps of greatest importance, because the income tax has become
a recognized fact of life, taxpayers will presume to be on notice.
33
Accordingly, it is our view that where there is reasonable cause
to believe or expect that a tax will be imposed upon'a presently
nontaxable transaction, the retrospective application of such tax
does not constitute a denial of due process .... Nor do the early
31. Id. at 726-27.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 729.
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tax decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by the Plaintiff
impart otherwise. See Nichols v. Coolidge, Blodgett v. Holden,
Untermyer v. Anderson. . . . [Citations omitted.]3
Certainly not all retroactive taxes can be accompanied by the notice
that the "interest equalization tax" had. Yet, there are certain iden-
tifiable qualities that a tax may possess that will put the taxpayer con-
stitutionally on notice. Most important, is the tax similar to an ex-
isting tax or is it a new or novel one, either in its nature or applica-
tion? Two, has there been substantial notice of the pending tax to the
class of taxpayers affected? Such notice could be by way of legislative
debate or by media publicity. The more novel the proposed tax the
greater the debate and/or publicity required. By contrast, a proposal
similar to existing law would require less attention by the media or
by way of legislative debate. Finally, the issue of foreseeability is one
of class foreseeability, i.e., would a reasonable member of the tax-paying
class affected be on notice, as opposed to a standard of individual fore-
seeability.
The Retroactive Minimum Tax on IDCs
It is clear that there was extensive publicity surrounding the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, and IDC provisions gained particular notoriety."
Certainly the oil industry was on alert that some sort of tax on in-
tangible drilling expenses was imminent. Yet the bill debated in Con-
gress and reported in the news media was of a very different character
than the one finally passed. In particular, the bill the industry anticipated
would not have affected those engaged in the oil industry as a primary
occupation. Rather, the proposed bill was aimed only at those who
used oil and gas investments as a means to shelter unrelated income
derived from other sources.
The original House bill, H.R. 10612, was reported on November
12, 1975.36 The committee report accompanying that bill made it clear
that it would not affect the oil producer who derived his primary living
from oil and gas operations:
In the case of an oil and gas drilling venture, the primary item
which generates losses for taxpayers seeking to shelter unrelated
income from tax is the deduction for intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs. The allowance of an immediate deduction for intangible
drilling and development costs enables taxpayers to invest in a
34. at 730.
35. infra text accompanying notes 39-43.





drilling venture in one year and obtain a deferral of income taxes
on much or all of their income from other sources in that year
because of the losses of the drilling venture generated by the
deduction for the intangible drilling costs.
Allowing a current deduction for intangible drilling costs is
usually justified on the grounds that it provides an incentive for
the discovery of needed reserves of oil and gas. For this purpose
the deduction for intangibles can be an efficient incentive (relative
to other tax incentives) since it directly encourages new drilling.
However, the use of these deductions to reduce income taxes on
unrelated income allows investing taxpayers to pay a much lower
proportion of their overall income in taxes than is paid by other
taxpayers.
Furthermore, allowing these deductions to reduce taxes on
unrelated income has in many cases led to these investments being
marketed solely for their tax advantages rather than on the basis
of the underlying soundness of the investment. This distorts the
workings of the market system and may tempt taxpayers to throw
away their money in unwise ventures in an attempt to reduce in-
come tax payments ...
To prevent taxpayers from sheltering unrelated income from
current taxation, your committee believes it is appropriate to apply
LAL to the intangible drilling and development costs for oil and
gas properties .... 37
The language and intent of the original House bill clearly aimed at
denying the full deduction for intangible drilling expenses to those not
deriving their principal income from the oil business. This is why oil
producers viewed the tax as limited to income unrelated to oil and
gas revenues. In other words, the intent of the bill was to tax investors
who do not earn their primary income by drilling for oil and gas. Thus,
those whose primary income was derived from the drilling of oil wells
had no prior notice that the bill was to be applicable to them. Indeed,
the rationale of the bill was aimed solely at those whose primary in-
come was unrelated to the oil and gas business.
Similarly, the original Senate proposal would not have applied the
tax to revenues derived from oil and gas sources. The original Senate
Report accompanying H.R. 10612 only applied the tax to income
unrelated to oil and gas revenues. As reported on June 10 and July
20, 1976,38 the Senate version did not apply to those-whose primary
business Was drilling for oil and gas:
37. Id.
38. S. Doe. No. 939, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3546-47.
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Intangible drilling expenses in excess of related income.-The
Committee amendment also adds an item of tax preference for ac-
celerated intangible drilling expenses on oil and gas wells in excess
of related income .... 39
Related income from oil and gas, which reduces the amount of
intangible drilling costs included in the minimum tax base, includes
gross income from oil and gas production (as defined for purposes
of computing the deduction for percentage depletion) less deduc-
tions for other than the deduction for accelerated intangible drill-
ing expenses. (Related income is computed by deducting non-
accelerated and intangible drilling costs). .... 4
From the time the proposed tax was introduced in Congress through
September 13, 1976, the oil producer was not on notice that the tax
would apply to his income so long as that income was oil and gas-
related and the intangible drilling expenses did not exceed that income.
But the bill was suddenly amended in Conference Committee to
eliminate the "unrelated" provision, thereby changing the tax's entire
purpose and scope.
The measure passed September 16, 1976 without the unrelated in-
come provision and became effective October 20, 1976. Therefore, the
industry was *not on notice or forewarned that the tax would apply
to it during the better part of the 1976 tax year. In fact, it did not
learn that the tax would apply to it until the tax year was three-fourths
over.
Moreover, the media treatment of the tax did not forewarn the in-
dustry that the tax was applicable to it. To the contrary, the tax was
characterized as being aimed at only those using the oil and gas" business
to shelter "unrelated income":
"The bill also eliminates some of the most egregious of the
shelters .. ."41
"The issues involved were of surpassing complexity, and the possible
outcomes made a big difference to the various types of wealthy in-
vestor taxpayers and tax-sheltered investments.
"The well-off doctor or lawyer who has some capital gains, .
used to be able to reduce his tax to a nominal amount. But no
more. .... "42
"It trimmed back allowances for special tax 'shelters' in real estate,
cattle raising, oil and gas drilling ..
39. Id. at 3546.
40. Id. at 3547.
41. Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1976, at A22, col. 1.
42. Id.




"It takes dead aim at several tax 'preferences' previously granted
to help well-heeled investors 'shelter' their income from the IRS...
the axe fell hardest on individuals investing in oil and gas drilling pro-
grams .. . In the past, a doctor sinking $100,000.00 into an oil drilling
program for example, could deduct his full investment ... ""
"restricts use of shelters in real estate, farms, oil and gas drillings,
movies. .... ,,4
Conclusion
The tax on excess intangible drilling expenses was originally aimed
at those who invested "unrelated" income in oil and gas operations
to shelter such income. The bill was not to apply to those primarily
involved in the oil and gas business, who had very little or no
"unrelated" income. Moreover, the bill was introduced into Congress
with language affecting only unrelated income and was debated in Con-
gress and reported in the news media with such language for three-
fourths of the tax year. Only in late September was the bill suddenly
redirected and applied to related income.
The foregoing analysis offers compelling reasons why the "minimum
tax" should not constitutionally apply to the oil and gas producer who
derives the majority of his income from this industry. Yet the merit
of the suggested approach to judging retroactive tax statutes should
go beyond the example at issue: the most fundamental concept im-
plicit in due process is notice. Although retroactive tax statutes will
always give rise to concern regarding whether the class affected has
notice, the test of foreseeability is an analytically and historically sound
way to deal with that concern while still allowing Congress the flex-
ibility it must have in exercising the taxing power.
Editor's Note: In December 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of retroactive minimum taxation
of intangible drilling costs."6 The taxpayer, a sole proprietorship, had
actively lobbied in Washington, D.C., concerning the Tax Reform Act
of 1976. In early 1976 the taxpayer became convinced that the proposed
minimum tax would not be imposed upon independent oil and gas pro-
ducers and commenced drilling operations prior to the passage of the
Act. The court rejected taxpayer's argument, based on the fact that
imposition of the tax was not foreseeable to him at the time drilling
operations commenced. The court reasoned that because the addition
of IDCs as an item of minimum taxation had been discussed since
44. Ruby, Adding Up The New Tax Bill, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, at 67.
45. BusiNEss WEEK, Sept. 27, 1976, at 27-28.
46. Ward v. United States, 695 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
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the original House Ways and Means Committee report, dated November
12, 1975, taxpayer could not argue that he had absolutely no reason
to expect that the transaction would be taxed." The court went on
to hold that the minimum tax on IDCs was an income, rather than
an excise, tax, and, hence, was not deductible as a business expense.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1355.
[Vol. 36:107
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